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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL DAVID DESTEFANO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
OREGON MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and MID-CENTURY 
EXCHANGE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 860472 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether under Oregon law the Young Driver Limitation 
endorsement is a valid preclusion of insurance coverage for "PIP" 
benefits, bodily injury liability, property damage liability and 
medical payments benefits. 
2. Whether plaintiff was occupying the insured vehicle 
within the meaning of Oregon law, and, therefore, is entitled to 
recover uninsured motorist benefits, medical payment benefits and 
"PIP" benefits. 
3. Whether the entry of Summary Judgment by the Third 
Judicial District court was in contravention of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
4. Whether the entry of Summary Judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff and in the manner entered by the lower court was 
premature because of lack of evidence supporting the underlying 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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facts and because of the need for a trial against the alleged 
"uninsured motorist." 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES IN THE CASE 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Addendum). 
Title 56, Chapter 743, Oregon Revised Statutes (See 
Addendum). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about September 10, 1986, plaintiff commenced this 
Declaratory Judgment Action against defendants Oregon Mutual 
Insurance Company ("Oregon Mutual") and Farmer's Insurance 
Exchange. The parties thereafter stipulated that Farmer's 
Insurance Exchange be dismissed as a defendant from the case and 
that Mid-Century Insurance Exchange be substituted as a defendant 
in its place. 
On February 5, 1986, Oregon Mutual filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Respondents files memoranda in opposition to 
Oregon Mutual's Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court 
denied Oregon Mutual's Motion, without prejudice, to permit 
defendant Farmer's Insurance Exchange to conduct further 
discovery. 
On July 10, 1986, Oregon Mutual filed a second Motion for 
Summary Judgment after additional discovery was conducted. On or 
about July 18, 1986, defendant Mid-Century Insurance Exchange 
filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. On or about July 23, 
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1986, plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in Opposition to defendants7 Motions for Summary 
Judgment. 
On July 31, 1986, the parties7 Motions for Summary Judgment 
were heard and the Honorable Raymond S. Uno took the motions 
under advisement• The Court rendered its decision on August 5, 
1986, denying Oregon Mutual7s Motion and plaintiff7s Motion 
against defendant Mid-Century Insurance Exchange, but granting 
Mid-Century Insurance Exchange and plaintiffs7 Motions for 
Summary Judgment against Oregon Mutual. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No transcript of the proceedings below is available for 
review, but the facts were virtually undisputed by all parties, 
as set forth herein. 
Oregon Mutual issued, in Oregon, an automobile policy to Rod 
L. and Deanna Cooper, residents of Bend, Oregon, the named 
insureds on said policy. The named insureds have three vehicles 
listed on the policy declarations for which coverage was 
provided, including a 1978 Ford Pinto, 1969 Ford 3/4-ton Pick-up 
Truck and a 1970 Custom Coach Camper. (See, R. at 138-9 and 
208.) 
Plaintiff was employed at Wagstaff7s Toyota with David 
Hancock, a relative of Deanna Cooper, one of the named insureds. 
While there is no evidence that either Hancock or Destafano was a 
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permissive user of the vehicle, Mr. Hancock obtained the 1978 
Pinto from Deanna Cooper in Oregon and drove it back to Utah. 
There he painted the automobile for the purported purpose of 
selling it. On November 17, 1984, Mr. Hancock relinquished 
possession of the Pinto to plaintiff, and plaintiff drove the 
Pinto to Kaysville, Utah, to show the automobile to plaintiff's 
girlfriend, Tina Larkin, and her parents and determine whether or 
not they were interested in purchasing the vehicle. Plaintiff, 
Tina Larkin and her parents drove the Pinto for a period of time 
in Kaysville, and Ms. Larkin7s parents made an offer to purchase 
the Pinto. Plaintiff and Tina Larkin left Ms. Larkin's parents 
at the Larkin residence and drove to Salt Lake City. Ms. Larkin 
drove the Pinto from Kaysville back towards Mr. Hancock's 
residence in Sandy, Utah. (See, R. at 138, 180 and 208.) 
Plaintiff and Ms. Larkin had travelled to approximately 90th 
South on Interstate 15, at which time the Pinto apparently 
exhausted its supply of gasoline. Consequently, the vehicle was 
parked out of the lane of traffic near the 90th South on-ramp. 
Plaintiff disembarked from the Pinto, leaving Ms. Larkin in the 
driver's seat of the Pinto, and walked down the on-ramp to a 
service station where he contacted Mr. Hancock by telephone and 
requested that he assist plaintiff and Ms. Larkin. (See, R. at 
139, 181 and 208.) 
Mr. Hancock drove his Mazda RX-7 to the service station and 
purchased some gas which he dispensed into a container he had 
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brought along. After purchasing the gasoline, Mr. Hancock drove 
plaintiff back to the Pinto where Ms. Larkin was still seated in 
the driver's seat. Approximately 12 to 20 minutes passed from 
the time plaintiff departed from the Pinto to contact Mr. 
Hancock, until the time Mr. Hancock and plaintiff reached the 
Pinto. Plaintiff never re-entered the Pinto, although he did 
give Ms. Larkin two hot chocolate drinks. Mr. Hancock removed 
the locking gas cap, for which only he had a key, and plaintiff 
proceeded to pour gasoline into the tank opening which was above 
the rear wheel of the Pinto. Plaintiff had emptied approximately 
one-half of the gas from the container into the Pinto's gas tank 
when the Pinto was struck from behind by the unoccupied Mazda 
RX-7, which was parked slightly to the left and just behind the 
Pinto, as a result of a collision between the Mazda and a 
Volkswagon Rabbit driven by a Ms. Dowdle. The Mazda struck 
plaintiff and the Pinto. (See, R. at 139-40, 181-2 and 208-9.) 
At the time of the accident, November 17, 1984, Tina Larkin, 
David Hancock and plaintiff were all under 24 years of age. 
(See, R. at 140 and 183.) 
Finally, it was undisputed before the trial court that the 
location of the accident was a mere fortuity and the trial court 
was required to apply principles of Oregon law. (See, R. at 138 
and 208.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff seeks to recover under an insurance policy issued 
by Oregon Mutual which narrowly precludes recovery for certain 
persons under 25 years of age, pursuant to the Young Driver 
Limitation endorsement. The Oregon Supreme Court has held that 
an insurer may not except drivers from uninsured motorist 
coverage solely because of the driver's age. However, the Court 
recognized that the driver's age is relevant to PIP benefits and, 
presumably, other benefits. Thus, Oregon Mutual is entitled to 
Summary Judgment against plaintiff on the issue of coverage for 
PIP and other benefits as a matter of law, or, at least, a 
reversal of the trial court's entry of Summary Judgment on this 
issue against Oregon Mutual. 
In accordance with Oregon law, the* Oregon Mutual policy 
required as a prerequisite to recovery of uninsured motorist 
benefits, PIP benefits and medical payment benefits, that the 
payment of benefits be made only to persons "occupying" the 
insured vehicle. This Court should follow the Oregon Court's 
definition of the term "occupying," and the only definition was a 
very literal, strict construction of the term "occupying." 
Therefore, as a matter of law, plaintiff was not "occupying" the 
insured vehicle. 
This Court may freely review the evidence in a light most 
favorable to Oregon Mutual, and find that respondents were not 
entitled to Summary Judgment, since the undisputed facts did not 
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clearly show that there was no reasonable probability that Oregon 
Mutual could prevail. 
Finally, Oregon Mutual sought Summary Judgment to eliminate 
the need for trial and discovery on issues which would have been 
rendered moot by entry of judgment in Oregon Mutual's favor. 
Thus, the trial court should not have prematurely entered Summary 
Judgment against Oregon Mutual, until discovery had been 
undertaken on the remaining issues in the case. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE YOUNG DRIVER LIMITATION ENDORSEMENT IS A VALID PRECLUSION 
OF INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR NO-FAULT ("PIP") BENEFITS, BODILY 
INJURY LIABILITY, PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY AND MEDICAL 
PAYMENTS BENEFITS 
The Oregon Mutual policy contains coverages for Personal 
Injury Protection ("PIP") benefits, bodily injury liability, 
property damage liability, medical payments benefits, uninsured 
motorists coverage and a variety of physical damage coverages 
which are not applicable in this case. In addition to certain 
enumerated conditions contained in the body of the policy, the 
policy also contains a "Young Driver Limitation" endorsement. 
This endorsement provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
In consideration of the issuance or continuation of the 
policy to which this endorsement is attached, it is 
agreed that coverages afforded by this policy shall not 
apply with respect to any loss arising out of the 
operation or use of the automobile(s) described below, 
or any replacement(s) thereof, by any driver under the 
age of 25 who is not a member of the Named Insured's 
family related by blood, marriage or adoption. 
1978 Ford Pinto 
Year and Make of Automobile 
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Thus, the policy has a narrow exception from coverage for 
only one of the three insured vehicles, the 1978 Ford Pinto, 
applicable solely to persons that sustain loss while operating or 
using the automobile who are not members of the Named Insured's 
family, and under twenty-five (25) years of age. The policy 
would cover any loss while one of the Named Insureds, or a family 
member, was operating any of the insured vehicles, or while any 
occupant was operating the 1969 Ford and 1970 camper, regardless 
of whether they were under twenty-five years. 
This Court may freely interpret the Oregon Mutual policy, 
since under Oregon law, which governs in this case, "[t]he 
construction of an insurance contract is generally a question of 
law." Cambron v. North-West Insurance Co., 687 P.2d 1132, 1134 
(Or. App. 1984) (citations omitted). See also, Theros v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 17 Ut.2d 205, 407 P.2d 685 (1965). 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Dairyland Insurance 
Co., 542 P.2d 113 (Or. 1976), involved an action by an automobile 
driver's insurer seeking contribution from the automobile owner's 
insurer, after the driver's insurer had paid the injured driver 
PIP and uninsured motorist benefits. The owner's insurer had 
refused to contribute towards the benefits paid to the injured 
driver based upon the following Young Driver Limitation 
endorsement which allegedly precluded responsibility for any 
coverage at all: 
The coverages afforded by the policy do not apply while 
the insured automobile is being driven by any person 
- 8 -
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under the age of twenty-five unless such person is 
named in the policy. 
Id. at 114. 
This apparently total exception from insurance coverage for 
anyone under twenty-five was found to contravene the legislative 
intent for promulgating mandatory uninsured motorist insurance 
coverage. Hence, the Court ruled that uninsured motorist 
benefits must be paid to any person injured by an uninsured 
motorist while occupying any insured vehicle, including any 
person under twenty-five. The Court recognized that an exception 
to uninsured motorist coverage would be improper, since uninsured 
motorist coverage was intended to be compulsory in all automobile 
policies and was designed to close the inherent gaps in other 
coverages when a named insured is injured by a motorist who is 
not himself insured. See, Title 56, Section 743.792, Oregon 
Revised Statutes (1983) . By contrast, the Young Driver 
Limitation endorsement is an agreement to preclude responsibility 
for coverage when the insured has not obtained and paid for 
additional coverage of the high-risk class of drivers under 25, 
other than the named insured. Thus, the Young Driver Limitation 
is only an exception from coverage for a person other than a 
named insured occupying the insured automobile and seeking 
No-Fault or PIP benefits, bodily injury liability, property 
damage liability and medical payments benefits. Indeed, the 
Court stated that "the age of the driver is relevant to the 
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coverage under the personal injury protection provision . . . ." 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
In the present case, the undisputed facts before the trial 
court were that the driver of the insured vehicle, and plaintiff, 
were under twenty-five years of age at the time of the accident. 
The Young Driver Limitation endorsement precludes policy coverage 
of any losses arising out of the operation or use of the insured 
vehicle by any driver under the age of twenty-five, with the 
exception of those losses that are covered by uninsured motorists 
insurance. Although the Oregon Mutual endorsement is a much 
narrower exception than the endorsement in Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity Co., the Oregon Court's rationale nevertheless appears 
to prohibit an endorsement which attempts to exclude uninsured 
motorist coverage for drivers under twenty-five, no matter how 
carefully drafted. However, the Court in Hartford also expressly 
recognized that the under-age endorsement may properly except the 
under age driver from other policy coverages where the driver's 
age is relevant. 
Thus, Oregon Mutual, and not respondents, was entitled to 
Summary Judgment on the grounds that, as a matter of law, its 
policy precluded coverage for PIP benefits, bodily injury 
liability, property damage liability, medical payments benefits 
and the physical damage coverages for injuries where the driver 
of the insured automobile was under 25 years of age. 
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ARGUMENT II 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT RECOVER UNINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS, 
MEDICAL PAYMENTS BENEFITS AND PIP BENEFITS, SINCE HE 
WAS NOT OCCUPYING THE INSURED VEHICLE 
Oregon law requires that every motor vehicle liability 
policy issued in the state shall provide uninsured motorist and 
PIP benefits. See, Title 56, Sections 743.789(1) and 743.800(1), 
Oregon Rev. Stat. However, uninsured motorist coverage is only 
required for an "insured" or a beneficiary of an "insured." See, 
Section 743.792. Moreover, an "insured" for purposes of 
uninsured motorist benefits is limited to the named insured as 
stated on the policy, and relatives resident of the same 
household and any other person while "occupying" an insured 
vehicle. See, Sections 743.792(2)(A) and (B). Similarly, PIP 
benefits are only prescribed for the person insured, relatives 
residing in the same household and passengers "occupying" the 
insured motor vehicle. See,,, Section 743.800(1). The term 
"occupying" is defined separately by the uninsured motorist 
provisions and the PIP benefits Section as an instance where a 
person is "in or upon or entering or alighting from" an insured 
vehicle. See, Sections 743.792 (2) (i) and 743.800(7)(c). 
Similarly, the Oregon Mutual insurance contract defines 
"occupying" as "in or upon or entering into or alighting from" a 
vehicle. 
In the present case, Oregon Mutual has not disputed that the 
1978 Ford Pinto was covered by the insurance contract issued to 
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Rod L. and Deanna Cooper. The policy provides that Oregon Mutucil 
will pay all reasonable medical expenses incurred within one year 
from the date of the accident to the insured named in the policy 
declarations, any relative, and any other person who sustains 
bodily injury caused by accident while "occupying" the insured 
vehicle described in the policy declarations. Moreover, the 
definition for the term "occupying" is defined the same for 
medical payments coverage as for uninsured motorists coverage. 
Thus, the uninsured motorists, medical payments benefits and 
PIP coverages all require, as a condition to coverage, that the 
person seeking coverage be "occupying" the insured vehicle, 
within the meaning of Title 56, Chapter 743 of the Oregon Revised 
Statutes. 
The only recent Oregon Supreme Court case interpreting the 
term "occupying" is State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Berg, 689 
P.2d 959 (Or. App. 1984), where the insurer sought a Declaratory 
Judgment that its automobile insurance policy precluded recovery 
by a third party, Berg, for injuries sustained from ultimately 
being struck by the insured's car after being thrown from her 
vehicle in a separate, initial collision with another vehicle. 
The insurer alleged that the PIP coverage only applied to 
injuries sustained by persons "occupying" the insured vehicle, 
which would not include the injuries Berg received as a result of 
being run over by the second vehicle while she lay immobilized in 
the lane of traffic. 
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The Court noted that the term "occupying" was not defined in 
the policy, and, hence, relied on the definition in the Personal 
Injury Protection Act, Section 743.800 (7) (c), Oregon Rev. Stat., 
wherein "[o]ccupying" means in or upon, or entering into or 
alighting from." 
The Court held as follows: 
Following her involuntary ejection from her vehicle, 
Berg landed in a traffic lane where, except for 
attempting to lift her head and right arm, she remained 
stationary. From the time she landed on the highway 
until the time she was struck by Miller's vehicle, she 
was apparently not ambulatory. In our opinion, those 
facts permit no other conclusion but that Berg at that 
point had completed all acts that a person in her 
circumstances reasonably would be expected to have 
done. She had gone as far as she was going to in 
leaving her vehicle; in fact, as far as she could go. 
She was not "alighting" from the vehicle; she had 
"alighted." That she then did not seek a place of 
safety or embark on a different course of conduct is 
not dispositive; she was unable to do so. We find that 
Berg completed the "alighting" process upon coming to 
rest on the pavement. From then on she no longer was 
"occupying" her vehicle and her status necessarily was 
that of a pedestrian within the policy and statutory 
definitions. The trial court erred in concluding that 
she was, as a matter of law, "occupying" her vehicle. 
Id. at 963 (emphasis added). 
In summary, the Court found that the evidence permitted no 
other conclusion than that the insured was not "occupying" her 
vehicle on the grounds that she had gone as far as she could go 
in alighting from her vehicle. Thus, the Court literally defined 
the term "occupying" despite the obvious fact that the sole 
reason she had gone as far as she could and otherwise completed 
all acts a person in her circumstances reasonably would be 
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expected to accomplish, was because she had been involuntarily 
ejected from her vehicle and thereby rendered immobile. The 
Court acknowledged that the insured was incapable of further 
alighting from or entering into, in or upon the insured vehicle 
as a result of an initial event involving the insured, which 
event was actually the beginning of the chain of events that 
culminated in the injury to the insured. 
In the present case, the undisputed facts are much stronger 
than in the Berg case, and, therefore should likewise compel this 
court to no other conclusion than that plaintiff was not 
"occupying" the insured vehicle at the time he was injured. In 
Berg only the very literal interpretation of "occupying" enabled 
the Court to rule that the insured was not covered, since the 
insured had only alighted from the insured vehicle seconds before 
being injured as a direct result of a chain-reaction multiple 
automobile collision. By contrast, in the instant case, 
plaintiff had not been inside the 1978 Pinto for at least twelve 
to twenty minutes prior to the subject accident. Indeed, if 
plaintiff was alighting from any vehicle, he was alighting from 
the RX-7 Mazda in which he was a passenger shortly before the 
accident. In Berg, an extreme set of facts was presented, since 
the insured remained in the immediate vicinity of the accident as 
a result of immobilizing injuries. Conversely, in the case at 
bar, plaintiff was voluntarily absent from the vicinity of the 
insured vehicle for the period of time it took to walk the 
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considerable distance to reach a service station off the 1-15 
freeway near 90th South. Plaintiff telephoned Dave Hancock for 
assistance, then purchased and filled a container with gasoline 
for the stalled automobile, then drove back to the Pinto with Mr. 
Hancock. Plaintiff never re-entered the insured vehicle after 
leaving Ms. Larkin to telephone Mr. Hancock. 
In the present case, plaintiff had gone as far as he could 
go in leaving the vehicle, he had even left the Interstate and 
was occupying another vehicle. Plaintiff had clearly: completed 
the "alighting process"; did not manifest any intent to promptly 
enter the insured vehicle; was not in or upon the vehicle; and, 
had embarked on a completely different course of conduct than 
occupying the Pinto as a passenger. 
The Oregon Supreme Court defines "occupying" in strict, 
literal terms, and this Court does not have jurisdiction to 
overrule Berg and must interpret the term strictly in accordance 
with the decision by that Court. 
ARGUMENT III 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED AGAINST OREGON MUTUAL IN 
CONTRAVENTION OF RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of. Civil Procedure provides 
that summary judgment is proper only when the record demonstrates 
that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In 
the present case, the disputed factual issues did not constitute 
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genuine issues of material fact, but respondents were not 
entitled to judgment against Oregon Mutual as a matter of law. 
Summary judgment "should be granted only when it clearly appears 
that there is no reasonable probability that the party moved 
against could prevail." Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676 
P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984) (citing Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & 
Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982)). 
The standard of review for a summary judgment permits the 
appellate court to take a hard look at the judgment, since this 
Court views the evidence "in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion and will allow the summary judgment to stand 
only if the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law on the undisputed facts." Barlow Society v. Commercial 
Security Bank, No. 20155 (July 31, 1986 Utah); see also. Cox v. 
Utah Mortgage and Loan Corp.. 716 P.2d 783, 785 (Utah 1986). 
As set forth above, respondents were not entitled to 
judgment against Oregon Mutual because plaintiff was not 
"occupying" the vehicle as required by statute and the insurance 
policy for recovery of PIP and uninsured motorist benefits. In 
addition, the Young Driver Limitation endorsement was a valid 
exception from coverage for all benefits but uninsured motorist 
coverage. In this case, the material facts were undisputed and 
Oregon law prohibited recovery of the uninsured motorist and PIP 
benefits, yet the trial court granted summary judgment. Hence, 
the summary judgment was granted in contravention of Rule 56, 
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since summary judgment should only be granted when it clearly 
appears that there is no reasonable probability that Oregon 
Mutual could prevail. 
ARGUMENT IV 
THE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PREMATURE 
Oregon Mutual moved for Summary Judgment for the avowed 
purpose of eliminating the necessity of obtaining further 
discovery concerning all coverages in the policy and narrow the 
issues for trial, in accordance with Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Certain obvious factual issues, which would have been 
rendered moot by entry of Summary Judgment in Oregon Mutual's 
favor, preclude entry of a total Summary Judgment against Oregon 
Mutual without further discovery and the elimination or 
resolution of certain factual issues. Summary Judgment should be 
denied as premature where discovery has not been completed, 
particularly where the information sought could infuse facts 
sufficient to defeat a Motion for Summary Judgment. See, Cox v. 
Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah 1984). 
In the present case, the Motion for Summary Judgment was 
brought by Oregon Mutual to determine whether it was necessary to 
undertake discovery concerning whether plaintiff and Ms. Larkin 
had express or implied permission to drive the insured vehicle 
and whether defendant Mid-Century Insurance Exchange was the 
primary or excess insurer for plaintiff's injuries. However, the 
trial court did not merely deny Oregon Mutual's motion, it 
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granted respondents7 Motions for Summary Judgment, 
notwithstanding, no factual basis established in the record. 
Therefore, the entry of summary judgment against Oregon Mutual 
was improper when the record is viewed in a light most favorable 
to Oregon Mutual, since discovery had not commenced on a number 
of issues relevant only if Oregon Mutual's motion for summary 
judgment was denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court improperly entered summary judgment against 
Oregon Mutual, since its policy and relevant Oregon law permits 
the insured to except drivers under twenty-five from PIP and 
medical payment benefits and requires that any person seeking 
uninsured motorist and PIP benefits must have been "occupying " 
the insured vehicle within the meaning of Sections 743.792(2) (i) 
and 743.800(7) (c), Oregon Rev. Stat. 
The undisputed facts, viewed in a light most favorable to 
Oregon Mutual, did not establish that Oregon Mutual had no 
reasonable probability of success at trial. Indeed, the trial 
court should have ruled as a matter of law that Oregon Mutual was 
entitled to summary judgment. 
Finally, the entry of summary judgment against Oregon Mutual 
forecloses it from discovery on the issues that led Oregon Mutual 
to seek summary judgment. 
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OMb 
Therefore, Summary Judgment should not have been entered 
against Oregon Mutual as a matter of law, and Oregon Mutual was 
entitled to judgment against respondents. 
DATED this zSu* day of December, 19J 
Donald J. /urser 
J. Angus Edwards 
FOWLER & PURSER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
TITLE 56. INSURANCE 
CHAPTER 743 
INSURANCE POLICIES 
MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY INSURANCE 
743.786. Definitions for ORS 743.785 TO 743.795 
As used in ORS 743.786 to 743.795: 
(1) "Uninsured motorist coverage" means coverage within the 
terms and conditions specified in ORS 743.792 insuring the 
insured, his heirs or his legal representative for all sums 
which he or they shall be legally entitled to recover as 
damages for bodily injury or death caused by accident and 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an 
uninsured motor vehicle in amounts or limits not less than 
the amounts or limits prescribed for bodily injury or death 
for a policy of insurance meeting the requirements of RS 
chapter 486. 
(2) "Motor Vehicle" means every self-propelled device in, 
upon or by which any person or property is or may be 
transported or drawn upon a public highway, but does not 
include: 
(a) Devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or 
tracks; 
(b) Motor trucks as defined in ORS 481.035, when the 
insured has employes who operate such trucks and such 
employes are covered by any workers7 compensation law, 
disability benefits law or any similar law; or 
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(c) Farm-type tractors or self-propelled equipment 
designed for use principally off public highways. 
(1967 c.482 Section 1; 1971 c.523 Section 11; 1979 c.842 Section 
7) 
• 
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ADDENDUM 
TITLE 56. INSURANCE 
CHAPTER 743 
INSURANCE POLICIES 
MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY INSURANCE 
743.789. Motor vehicle liability policies to provide uninsured 
motorist coverage; underinsurance coverage 
(1) Every motor vehicle liability policy insuring against 
loss suffered by any natural person resulting from liability 
imposed by law for bodily injury or death arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall 
provide uninsured motorist coverage therein or by indorsement 
thereon when such policy is either: 
(a) Issued for delivery in this state; or 
(b) Issued or delivered by an insurer doing business in 
this state with respect to any motor vehicle then 
principally used or principally garaged in this state. 
(2) The insurer issuing such policy shall offer one or more 
options of uninsured motorist coverage larger than the 
amounts prescribed to meet the requirements of ORS chapter 
486, up to the limits provided under the policy for motor 
vehicle bodily injury liability insurance. Offers of 
uninsured motorist coverage larger than the amounts required 
by ORS chapter 486 shall include underinsurance coverage for 
damages or death caused by accident and arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle that is 
insured for an amount that is less than the insured's 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
uninsured motorist coverage. Underinsurance benefits shall 
be equal to uninsured motorist coverage benefits less the 
amount recovered form other automobile liability insurance 
policies. 
(3) Underinsurance coverage shall be subject to ORS 743.792. 
(1967 Section 2; 1975 c.390 Section 1; 1981 c.586 Section 1) 
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ADDENDUM 
TITLE 56. INSURANCE 
CHAPTER 743 
INSURANCE POLICIES 
MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY INSURANCE 
743.792. Requirements of uninsured motorist coverage 
Every policy required to provide the coverage specified in 
ORS 743.789 shall provide uninsured motorist coverage which in 
each instance is no less favorable in any respect to the insured 
or the beneficiary than if the following provisions were set 
forth in the policy. However, nothing contained in this section 
shall require the insurer to reproduce in such policy the 
particular language of any of the following provisions: 
(1)(a) The insurer will pay all sums which the insured, 
his heirs or his legal representative shall be legally 
entitled to recover as general and special damages from the 
owner or operator of an uninsured vehicle because of bodily 
injury sustained by the insured caused by accident and 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such 
uninsured vehicle. Determination as to whether the insured, 
his heirs or his legal representative is legally entitled to 
recover such damages, and if so, the amount thereof, shall be 
made by agreement between the insured and the insurer, or, in 
the event of disagreement, by arbitration. 
(b) No judgment against any person or organization 
alleged to be legally responsible for bodily injury, 
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except for proceedings instituted against the insurer as 
provided in this policy, shall be conclusive, as between 
the insured and the insurer, on the issues of liability 
of such person or organization or of the amount of 
damages to which the insured is legally entitled. 
As used in this policy: 
(a) "Insured," when unqualified, means when applied to 
uninsured motorist coverage: 
(A) The named insured as stated in the policy and any 
person designated as named insured in the schedule and, 
while residents of the same household, the spouse of any 
such named insured and relatives of either; provided, 
neither such relative nor spouse is the owner of a 
vehicle not described in the policy; and provided 
further, if the named insured as stated in the policy is 
other than an individual or husband and wife who are 
residents of the same household, the named insured shall 
be only a person so designated in the schedule; and 
(B) Any other person while occupying an insured vehicle 
provided the actual use thereof is with the permission 
of the named insured. 
(b) "Insured Vehicle," except as provided in paragraph 
(c) of this provision, means: 
(A) The vehicle described in the policy or a newly 
acquired or substitute vehicle, as each of those terms 
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is defined in the public liability coverage of the 
policy, insured under the public liability provisions of 
the policy; or 
(B) A nonowned vehicle operated by the named insured or 
spouse if a resident of the same household; provided 
that the actual use thereof is with the permission of 
the owner of such vehicle and such vehicle is not owned 
by nor furnished for the regular or frequent use of the 
insured or any member of the same household. 
(c) "Insured vehicle" does not include a trailer of any 
type unless such trailer is a described vehicle in the 
policy. . 
(d) "Uninsured vehicle," except as provided in 
paragraph (e) of this provision, means: 
(A) A vehicle with respect to the ownership, 
maintenance or use of which there is no collectible 
automobile bodily injury liability insurance or bond, in 
at least the amounts or limits prescribed for bodily 
injury or death for a policy of insurance meeting the 
requirements of ORS chapter 486, applicable at the time 
of the accident with respect to any person or 
organization legally responsible for the use of such 
vehicle, or with respect to which there is such 
collectible bodily injury liability insurance or bond 
applicable at the time of the accident but the insurance 
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company writing the same denies coverage thereunder or, 
within two years of the date of the accident, such 
company writing the same become voluntarily or 
involuntarily declared bankrupt or for which a receiver 
is appointed or becomes insolvent. It shall be a 
disputable presumption that a vehicle is uninsured in 
the event the insured and the insurer, after reasonable 
efforts, fail to discover within 90 days from the date 
of the accident, the existence of a valid and 
collectible automobile bodily injury liability insurance 
or bond applicable at the time of the accident; or 
(B) A hit-and-run vehicle as defined in paragraph (f) 
of this provision. 
(C) A phantom vehicle as defined in paragraph (g) of 
this provision. 
(e) "Uninsured vehicle11 does not include: 
(A) An insured vehicle; 
(B) A vehicle which is owned or operated by a 
self-insurer within the meaning of any motor vehicle* 
financial responsibility law, motor carrier law or any 
similar law; 
(C) A vehicle which is owned by the United States of 
America, Canada, a state, a political subdivision of any 
such government or an agency of any of the foregoing; 
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(D) A land motor vehicle or trailer, if operated on 
rails or crawler-treads or while located for use as a 
residence or premises and not as a vehicle; 
(E) A farm-type tractor or equipment designed for use 
principally off public roads, except while actually upon 
public roads; or 
(F) A vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular or 
frequent use of the insured or any member of his 
household, 
(f) "Hit-and-run vehicle" means a vehicle which causes 
bodily injury to an insured arising out of physical 
contact of such vehicle with the insured or with a 
vehicle which the insured is occupying at the time of 
the accident; provided; 
(A) There cannot be ascertained the identity of either 
the operator or the owner of such hit-and-run vehicle; 
(B) The insured or someone on his behalf shall have 
reported the accident within 72 hours to a police, peace 
or judicial officer, to the Motor Vehicles Division of 
the Department of Transportation of the State of Oregon 
or to the equivalent department in the state where the 
accident occurred, and shall have filed with the insurer 
within 3 0 days thereafter a statement under oath that 
the insured or his legal representative has a cause or 
causes of action arising out of such accident for 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
damages against a person or persons whose identity is 
unascertainable, and setting forth the facts in support 
thereof; and 
(C) At the insurer's request, the insured or his legal 
representative makes available for inspecting the 
vehicle which the insured was occupying at the time of 
the accident. 
(g) "Phantom vehicle" means a vehicle which causes 
bodily injury to an insured arising out of a motor 
vehicle accident which is caused by an automobile which 
has no physical contact with the insured or the vehicle 
which the insured is occupying at the time of the 
accident, provided: 
(A) There cannot be ascertained the identity of either 
the operator or the owner of such phantom vehicle; 
(B) The facts of such accident can be corroborated by 
competent evidence other than the testimony of the 
insured or any person having an uninsured motorist claim 
resulting from the accident; and 
(C) The insured or someone on his behalf shall have 
reported the accident within 72 hours to a police, peace 
or judicial officer, to the Motor Vehicles Division of 
the Department of Transportation of the State of Oregon 
or to the equivalent department in the state where the 
accident occurred, and shall have filed with the insurer 
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within 3 0 days thereafter a statement under oath that 
filed with the insurer within 30 days thereafter a 
statement under oath that the insured or his legal 
representative has a cause or causes of action arising 
out of such accident for damages against a person or 
persons whose identity is unascertainable, and setting 
forth the facts in support thereof. 
(h) "Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death resulting therefrom. 
(i) "Occupying" means in or upon or entering into or 
alighting from. 
(j) "State" includes the District of Columbia, a 
territory or possession of the United States and a 
province of Canada. 
* * * * * * * 
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ADDENDUM 
TITLE 56. INSURANCE 
CHAPTER 743 
INSURANCE POLICIES 
MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY INSURANCE 
743.800. Personal injury protection benefits for motor vehicle 
liability policies; applicability; definitions for ORS 743.800 to 
743.835 
(1) Every motor vehicle liability policy issued for delivery 
in this state that covers any private passenger motor vehicle 
shall provide personal injury protection benefits to the 
person insured thereunder, members of that person,s family 
residing in the same household, passengers occupying the 
insured motor vehicle and pedestrians struck by the insured 
motor vehicle. "Personal injury protection benefits" means 
the benefits described in this section and ORS 743.805 and 
743.815. 
(2) Personal injury protection benefits apply to a person's 
injury or death resulting; 
(a) In the case of the person insured under the policy 
and members of that person's family residing in the same 
household, from the use or maintenance of any motor 
vehicle, except the following vehicles: 
(A) A motor vehicle, including a motorcycle or moped, 
which is owned by any of such persons and which is not 
covered by a motor vehicle liability insurance policy 
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that provides personal injury protection benefits with 
respect to the use and maintenance of that vehicle; 
(B) A motorcycle or moped which is not owned by any of 
such persons, but this exclusion applies only when the 
injury or death results from such person's operating or 
riding upon the motorcycle or moped; and 
(C) A motor vehicle not included in subparagraph (A) or 
(B) of this paragraph and not a private passenger motor 
vehicle. However, this exclusion applies only when the 
injury or death results from such person's operating or 
occupying the motor vehicle. 
(b) In the case of a passenger occupying or a 
pedestrian struck by the insured motor vehicle, from the 
use or maintenance of the vehicle. 
(3) Personal injury protection benefits consist of payments 
for expenses, loss of income and loss of essential services 
as provided in ORS 743.80. 
(4) An insurer shall pay all personal injury protection 
benefits promptly after proof of loss has been submitted to 
the insurer. 
(5) The potential existence of a cause of action in tort 
does not relieve an insurer from the duty to pay personal 
injury protection benefits. 
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(6) Disputes between insurers and beneficiaries about the 
amount of personal injury protection benefits shall be 
decided by arbitration. 
(7) As used in ORS 743.800 to 743.835: 
(a) "Motor vehicle" means a self-propelled land motor 
vehicle or trailer, other than: 
(A) A farm type tractor or other self-propelled 
equipment designed for use principally off public roads, 
while not upon public roads; 
(B) A vehicle operated on rails or crawler-treads; or 
(C) A vehicle located for use as a residence or 
premises. 
(b) "Motorcycle" and "moped" have the meanings given 
those terms in ORS 481.004. 
(c) "Occupying" means in, or upon, or entering into or 
alighting from. 
(d) "Pedestrian" means a person while not occupying a 
self-propelled vehicle. 
(e) "Private passenger motor vehicle" means a 
four-wheel passenger or station wagon type motor vehicle 
not used as a public or livery conveyance, and includes 
any other four-wheel motor vehicle of the utility, 
pickup body, sedan delivery or panel truck type not used 
for whole-sale or retail delivery other than farming, a 
self-propelled mobile home, and a farm truck. 
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(1971 c.523 Section 2; 1973 c.551 Section 1; 1975 c.784 Section 
1; 1979 c.871 Section 45; 1981 c.414 Section 1. 
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ADDENDUM 
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain declaratory judgment 
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon 
all or any part thereof. 
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to 
all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. 
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as 
to the amount of damages. 
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(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion 
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or 
for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at 
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the 
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, 
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further 
proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the 
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The 
Court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
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OMbaddendum 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. 
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from 
the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify 
his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment 
or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or 
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the 
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits 
presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any 
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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